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Abstract
This thesis explores the social implications as well as impact of
the Moroccan World Bank-supported adjustment program. It
determines which social groups are affected by the different
measures included in the program; which policy reforms have the
most deleterious effects on the poor; and what measures can be
taken to alleviate these costs.
There has been increasing awareness that adjustment is proving
to be a longer and more complicated process than originally
expected, and that consequently, the social costs of adjustment
extend beyond the short-run. It is therefore recognized that the poor
need to be protected from the negative impact of austerity measures
such as demand restraint and cuts in government spending, as even
if growth is revived, the poor will only benefit to the limited extent
that trickle-down occurs.
Hence, adjustment programs need to be redesigned to protect
the poor's welfare and standard of living. Several recommendations
are suggested. In the mainstream, these include improving the
efficiency in resource allocation by better targeting scarce resources
towards those most in need. In addition, in the spirit of
"redistribution with growth", increasing the access of the poor to
productive assets (such as land and credit), as well as to education
and health services, is advocated so as to encourage the poor's
participation in the adjustment process.
Less "orthodox" recommendations to protect the poor focus on
improving the design and implementation of the adjustment
program. Structuralists support a more gradual adjustment process;
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less emphasis on contractionary policies; and a lower degree of
liberalization in trade and industry, and the agriculture sector, as
well as in financial markets. Moreover, they underscore the need for
compensatory programs for the poor, and the need for additional
external financing. Finally, structuralists recommend that the
programs be redesigned to more adequately reflect institutional
settings and the circumstances of the country in question; in this case
Morocco.
In brief, "listening to the people", as well as drawing them into
the growth process is advocated as a means of ensuring the viability
of the program and the welfare of the poor. Such policies to mitigate
the social costs of adjustment are feasible without undermining the
objectives of adjustment. Adjustment programs can and should
promote social development and economic adjustment
simultaneously. Without these dual objectives, the sustainability of
the programs becomes questionable.
Thesis Supervisor: Lance Taylor
Title: Professor of Economics
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Introduction
Recently, there has been growing controversy surrounding the
impact of adjustment programs on social welfare. This thesis focuses
on the Moroccan adjustment program which provides evidence of a
deterioration in social conditions. The controversy arises because
despite available evidence, orthodox economists argue that it is
difficult to isolate adjustment as the sole cause of deteriorating social
conditions, and that the failure to adjust may prove even more costly
to the poor.
The main argument is that adjustment and improved standards
of living need not be mutually exclusive, rather that policies to
mitigate the costs borne by the poor can be integrated in the
adjustment program without undermining its objectives. Indeed,
protecting the poor's welfare from the negative impact of austerity
measures ensures the sustainability of the program. Hence, social
development can, and should be promoted simultaneously with
economic adjustment.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I presents the
political, economic and social characteristics of Morocco. Chapter II
first briefly describes the World Bank-supported structural
adjustment program that Morocco embarked on in 1983. It then
reviews the theoretical implications for the poor of the policy
measures included in the program from both the neoclassical and the
structuralist perspectives; this is followed by an exploration of the
actual social impact on the poor. Chapter III reviews "orthodox" as
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well as "heterodox" recommendations to safeguard the interests of
the poor during the program as well as in the longer-run, and
determines to what extent these are reflected in the design of the
Bank-supported program. Finally, chapter IV presents lessons - that
the assessment of the Moroccan experience has provided - for
improving the design of the Moroccan program, as well as that of
future adjustment programs.
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Chapter I. Background
A. The Political Setting
Morocco gained political independence from France and Spain
in 1956, after a colonial rule that lasted 44 years, the shortest such
period in North Africa. The new state is a kingdom, ruled by the
Alawi dynasty.
Since 1975, Morocco has been engaged in a difficult and
expensive desert war against the Western Saharan nationalist
movement, the Polisario Front, which has received support from
Algeria. By 1985, Morocco had control over four fifth of the area of
the Western Sahara, and in 1988, though important differences
persist, progress was made in reaching a settlement of the Sahara
question.
Today, the role of the monarchy may not be questioned.
However, social inequality and official corruption within the
country's traditional and patrimonial system contribute to a feeling
of growing discontent among the population. Given that power is
centralized in the monarchy, political parties and unions have little
influence in their own right. Opportunity for a more equitable
distribution of the nation's wealth is limited, as influence is based on
personal relationships, and access to resources is largely determined
by family or political connections. The population's growing
discontent has been further exacerbated by severe economic
problems and the costs of the war in the Sahara, and resulted in two
serious outbreaks of urban unrest and violence in the first half of
the decade.
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B. The Economy
With a GNP per capita of 590 (1986 US Dollars), Morocco ranks
among the lower middle-income (LMI) countries.
Morocco's economy has an important agricultural sector, which
although amounting to only only 21% of GDP, provides employment
for 41% of the estimated 5.7 mn labor force (according to 1985
statistics). The second largest sector is services which is dominated
by commerce and employs 35% of the labor force. There is also a
relatively diversified manufacturing sector which constitutes 17% of
GDP, and a mining sector dominated by phosphates and which
amounts to 7% of GDP.
Phosphates are Morocco's leading exports, followed by
agricultural produce, particularly citrus fruits. However, Morocco has
not reached agricultural self-sufficiency (this is in part the result of
the severe droughts of the early 1980s) and is dependent on oil
imports. This dependency has translated into heavy food and energy
import costs, which in turn have produced a structural deficit in
merchandise trade. The deficit has been in part offset by tourism
and workers' remittances which are equal in weight to phosphates
revenues, although recently there has been worrying evidence of a
declining trend in worker's remittances. Moreover, due to a growing
foreign debt burden, the economy has suffered successive current
account deficits in recent years.
Starting from a low debt position in 1974, Morocco became by
1985 one of the most highly indebted countries in the world with an
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external debt of $12 billion, three times the export revenues, and a
debt ratio of 70% before rescheduling. These figures are largely
attributable to the government deficit.
Morocco has a mixed economy, and apart from a short lived
Moroccanization (majority domestic shareholding in all businesses),
economic policy has been essentially liberal, its support base being
the traditional bourgeoisie which has long established interests in
trade and services, and foreign economic interests which the
government attempted to maintain following independence.
Since 1983, the economy has been undergoing substantial
reforms as part of a World Bank-supported adjustment program
designed to enable the country to cope with its balance of payments
crisis. More recently, an agreement was reached on the terms for
economic unity and cooperation among North African countries or
the Greater Maghreb. This will allow Morocco to diversify its export
markets in anticipation of the approaching 1992 deadline for an
integrated European market which presently absorbs 60% of its
exports, particularly agricultural.
C Poverty and the Social Welfare Problem(1 )
1. Identification of the Problem
Despite a significant reduction of poverty over the last 20
years, Morocco's current poverty rate of 30% is still relatively high
(1) This section of the chapter makes extensive use of the World Bank Social Sector
Strategy for Morocco (1988).
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by international standards. With 30% of its population below the
poverty line (according to World Bank definitions), Morocco counts
6.6 million of the world's poor.
Although a satisfactory rate of growth has been achieved in
recent years, economic progress has failed to reach large sections of
the population as evidenced by the unfavorable levels of social
indicators such as child death rate, infant mortality, and the
illiteracy rate (Table 1). On the other hand, other social indicators
such as gross primary and secondary school enrollments, and the
crude death rate per thousand have marked significant gains (Table
2), reflecting the high level of GDP (10%) that was devoted to the
implementation of social policies over the past two decades.
Despite these social achievements, Morocco's social indicators
still compare poorly to the averages of other lower middle-income
countries (Table 1), and even trail behind the indicators of countries
with lower per capita income such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Sri Lanka (Table 3). Moreover, these national averages understate
the magnitude of the poverty problem for the rural population, the
poor, and women for whom social conditions tend to be worse. For
instance, the infant and child death rate are higher in rural than in
urban areas, as is population per physician. And, education levels
(and therefore literacy) are considerably lower among women and
the absolute poor (those living below minimum requirements of food
and shelter). (Table 2)
A distinction is necessary between the poor and the ultra-poor
who consume less than 75%-80% of the minimum nutritional
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requirements; and within these two categories, different absolute
poverty measures are defined for urban and rural areas, in
recognition of the differences in rural and urban dietary and other
consumption habits, and consumer prices. (Table 4)
Preliminary analysis shows that the incidence of absolute
poverty in the population declined during the 1970-1985 period
from 38% to 29% in urban areas and from 45% to 30% in rural areas.
On an aggregate level, the percentage of the population below the
poverty threshold declined from 41.5% in 1970 to 29.5% in 1985.
However, the absolute number of poor increased slightly from
6,500,000 in 1980 to 6,600,000 in 1985. Table 5 indicates that in
1985, 16% of the total population were ultra poor (18% of the urban
population and 14% of the rural population). This translates to
1,830,000 people in urban areas and 1,730,000 in rural areas (WB,
1988: 2).
The evolution of income distribution is another indication of
whether there have been reductions in poverty through the benefits
of the rapid development of the 1970s and early 1980s and through
greater equity. In 1985 the distribution of expenditures was uneven
with greater inequality in urban areas where the Gini coefficient is
0.41 as opposed to 0.37 in rural areas. It is hence fair to conclude
that little reduction in inequality has been achieved over the fifteen-
year period 1970-1985.
Despite rapid economic development in the 1970s and early
1980s, poverty alleviation and reduction has not been remarkable.
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This is an important consideration, not only for humanitarian
reasons, but also for the long-term economic growth of Morocco.
Although the effort for the reduction of poverty may absorb
resources valuable for the short-run growth of the economy, such an
effort may strengthen the long-run resource base of the economy.
First poverty reduction would expand and improve the human
capital basis of the Moroccan economy; second it would increase the
national income; third it would decrease government expenditures
on nutrition, health care, and other welfare programs (although, as
will be shown later, government expenditure on social services are
already too low); and fourth it would decrease fertility and the
population growth rate, allowing for faster growth of per capital
income.
2. Causes of Poverty
2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Findings
Theoretical and empirical findings in developing countries
indicate that poverty is due to, inter alia, joblessness, low
productivity, and low wages. These in turn have been found to be
connected in the case of the poor with three major factors: One is
the low human capital development, i.e. lack of education, literacy,
and vocational skills because of large household size and high
fertility rate, but mostly because of demand factors such as the
opportunity cost of sending children to school, as well as, on the
supply side, the inadequate provision of social services. The low
human capital development is also the result of inadequate nutrition
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and a poor health status, again the reflection of inadequate supply of
social services or lack of accessibility to health facilities.
A second factor is the limited access to productive inputs such
as credit, capital, and technology, and the third factor is the specific
sectoral and labor market dynamics of the economy, such as slow job
creation, low quality of new jobs, and rapid labor force growth.
Research also indicates that poverty in developing countries is
equally related to large household size; lack of productive assets,
particularly land; and ownership of unproductive assets.
2.2 Characteristics of the Poor and Ultra-poor in Morocco
The Poor
The poor are almost equally distributed in rural and urban
areas, as indicated by the small variation of per capita expenditure
across regions. Hence poverty in Morocco, unlike most other low
middle-income countries, is not simply a rural phenomenon (Table
5). Most of the households in Morocco are large, consisting of more
than 4 persons. In 1985, 72% of the poor households in rural areas
and 76% in urban areas comprised 5 or more persons, and 31% and
25% of poor households in urban and rural areas respectively had
more than 9 persons. The overwhelming majority of the poor
household heads: 82% was over 35 in 1985, of which 44% were
between 35 and 60 years old, and 38% were 60 years old and over.
This age composition is almost the same in both urban and rural
areas.
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Again, the overwhelming majority of the poor-household
heads: 85% and 87% in urban and rural areas respectively, had no
education according to a 1985 survey, with low enrollment of poor
children due to the demand and supply factors mentioned earlier.
These statistics confirm the causal relationship between low human
capital development and poverty.
In terms of occupational profiles, the 1985 consumption survey
indicates that 39% of the poor household heads in rural areas were
farmers, 17% agricultural workers, around 10% non-agricultural
workers, and 21% were inactive (not looking for a job); 56% of the
rural poor were therefore heavily dependent on agriculture. In
urban areas, poverty was spread among a number of socio-economic
groups: merchants counted 13%, service and office employees 21%,
non-agricultural workers 20%, and 23% were inactive. "The
inactivity reflects, in most cases, inability to supply labor and ultra-
poverty status." (WB, 1988:4)
The available data regarding asset ownership of poor
households are incomplete. However, research undertaken by Ennaji
(1986), as well as research in other countries has indicated that
poverty is connected to lack of productive assets or the ownership of
unproductive assets, such as small farms with inferior land quality.
Ennaji writes:
In North Africa, Morocco can be taken as an example to
illustrate the problem of farmers without land. He adds:
The economic difficulties of most farmers lie in this new
social framework: the land is owned by a minority, and
the high population growth rate has increased the
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imbalance between available resources and the needs of
the population. (Ennaji, 1986: 42)
Ennaji explains that since most of the rural poor no longer possess
sufficient means of production, they are driven to sell their labor for
a subsistence wage in several economic sectors, engaging in such
activities as gathering, handicrafts, and petty trade. Hence, few are
left to work on the farm. Women sometimes leave the home in
search of paid work, children are taken out of school to do odd jobs
and seek work elsewhere when they reach adulthood; thus the
family breaks up. "The changing rural world has completely
disrupted the living conditions of the poorest members of the
community" (Ennaji, 1986: 42).
Moreover, the breaking down of traditional institutions has not
as yet been replaced by new structures such as government services
and local authorities. This is confirmed by the World Bank social
sector strategy for Morocco which states:
Municipal and provincial governments spend only limited
funds on social service provision. The private sector's
participation in the provision of basic social services, such
as health and education, especially for lower income
groups, is also minimal. This suggests that at present the
key policy variables regarding the provision of social
services in Morocco (in the domain of education, health,
professional training and youth services) is the central
government social spending. (WB, 1988: 5)
However, indicators clearly show that the magnitude of public
spending on social programs does not match the basic needs of poor
households. Hence inefficient and/or inequitable social services
provision can be considered another significant contributor to the
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poverty situation in Morocco. The magnitude and trends in
government social spending will be reviewed in greater detail in
Chapter II.
A final characteristic of the poor, their health status is where
the most difference is apparent between the rural and urban areas.
Conditions of relatively high maternal mortality rate, child death
rate, infant mortality rate and low life expectancy continue to
persist, and they are worse for the rural poor.
The Ultra-Poor
There is little information regarding the characteristics of the
ultra-poor in Morocco. In general, ultra-poor households are very
large with over seven members, have higher child/adult ratios,
higher female/male ratios than the rest of the population, and
expenditure per person falls below the ultra-poverty threshold. The
group mostly consists of women and the elderly. Its general
economic characteristics are: lack of ownership of productive assets,
or the ownership of land which is fragmented and remote. Many of
the ultra-poor are casual adult laborers; urban and female ultra-poor
exhibit higher employment rates; and female ultra-poor feature
sharply lower participation rates in towns than in rural areas. (WB,
1988:5)
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Table 1
Comparison of Morocco's Most Recent* Social Indicators
with the Averages for Lower Middle Income (LMI) Countries
LMI
Social Indicators Morocco Average
POSITIVE
GDP Growth Rate (percent) 3.3 1.8
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 59 58
Birth Rate (per thousand) 33 35
Crude Death Rate (per thousand) 10 10
Calorie Supply (per capita) 2,729 2,511
NEGATIVE
GNP Per Capita (dollars)
Infant Mortality Rate
Child Death Rate (per thousand)
Population Per Physician (per thousand)
Gross Primary School Enrollment (percent)
Male
Female
Gross Secondary School Enrollment (percent)
Male
Female
Overall Adult Illiteracy Rate (percent)
Male
Female
Moderately Malnurished Children (percent)
590
90
52
18.6
72
87
58
31
38
25
60
40
80
40
750
77
11
7.9
104
111
100
42
50
41
NA
NA
NA
NA
Sources: The World Bank, 1988. World Development Report, 1988.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank UNESCO, 1988.
The State of the World's Children, 1988. Oxford University Press.
In Morocco: Social Sector Strategy (WB, 1988).
Note: *Time of references varies by indicator and represents most recent
information. Year of reference for any indicator is 1981, 1985, or 1986.
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Table 2
Trends in Morocco's Social Indicators
Most
Social Indicators 1965 1973 Recent*
GNP Per Capita (dollars) 220 446.6 620
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 49 53 59
Birth Rate (per thousand) 49 44 33
Crude Death Rate (per thousand) 18 15 10
Infant Mortality Rate (per thousand) 145 120 90
Child Death Rate (per thousand) 32 48 52
Population per Physician (thousands) 12.1 13.1 18.6
Gross Primary School Enrollment (percentage) 57 62 72
Male 78 78 87
Female 35 45 58
Gross Secondary School Enrollment (percentage) 11 16 31
Male 16 21 38
Female 5 12 25
Sources: The World Bank, 1987. Social Indicators of Development, Washington, D.C.
The World Development Report, 1988. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1988.
World Development Report, 1988. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
In Morocco: Social Sector Strategy (WB, 1988).
Note: *Time of references varies by indicator and represents most recent information.
Year of reference for any indicator is 1981, 1985, or 1986.
19
Table 3
Morocco: Basic Indicators
Comparison with Countries with Lower Per Capita Income
Source: The World Bank. 1988. World Development Report, 1988. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
In Morocco: Social Sector Strategy (WB, 1988).
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Infant Primary Matern.
Mort. School Mort.
GNP Pop. Gini Rate Enrol. (per
per Growth Coefficient Unemployment (per Child (% of 100,000
Capita Rate 1000 Life Death age live
('86US 1980- births) Exp. Rate group) births)
dollars) 1986 Coeff. Year Rate Year 1986 1986 1986 1985 1980
MOROCCO 590 2.5 0.41 1985 10.72 1982 90 59 52 81 327
PHILIPPINES 560 2.5 0.52 1983 5.3 1981 46 63 4 106 80
YEMEN, ARAB REP. 550 2.5 0.36 1986 12.5 1986 152 45 34 67 n/a
INDONESIA 490 2.2 n/a n/a ra ra 87 56 12 118 800
YEMEN, PDR 470 3.1 n/a n/a n/a ra 142 46 30 66 100
SRI LANKA 400 1.5 0.52 1982 11.7 1982 29 70 2 103 90
Table 4
Absolute Poverty and Ultra-Poverty Threshold
(in 1985 dirhams)
Source: Bank staff calculations based on the 1970 and
In Morocco: Social Sector Strategy (WB, 1988).
1985 Household Consumption Surveys.
Table 5
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Major Poverty Groups
Geographic Geographic
Composition Distribution % Major
of the Ultra- GINI Poverty
Population % Poor Poor Group
Urban 43% 29% 18% 0.41 Unemployed and
workers in
informal sector
Rural 57% 30% 14% 0.37 Landless farm
workers
TOTAL 100% 29.50% 16% - -
Source: Morocco: Social Sector Strategy (WB, 1988).
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Ultra-Poverty Poverty
Threshold Threshold
Urban Rural Urban Rural
1 Food Expenditures 1,246 1,004 1,555 1,264
2 Non-Food Expenditures 762 278 954 349
3 Absolute Poverty Line per person/year 2,008 1,453 2,509 1,613
Chapter II. Social Impact of Structural Adjustment:
Emphasis on the Poor
A. The Structural Adjustment Program
The economic turbulence of the late 1970s and early 1980s has
translated into a loss of a decade or more of economic progress for
most of the developing world.
In Morocco, the past decade has been characterized by urban
drift (a decade long drought having gradually driven thousands of
poverty-stricken farmers from rural areas to urban slums); rising
protective barriers in industrial economies; sluggish industrial
development in a country that is oil-poor; low prices of phosphates
on the depressed world market; and serious agricultural failings. The
result has been an alarming growth in foreign indebtedness, sharply
reduced investment in development projects, and increasingly
widespread poverty.
In 1983, after Morocco's access to international markets was
sharply reduced, a new government was appointed to confront the
economic crisis. Under the advice of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, the government designed a program with
dual objectives: (1) to stabilize the economy in the short-term by
reducing aggregate demand and the size of the government budget
deficit; and (2) to enhance the efficiency of the economy in the
production of goods and services by reforming the underlying
structure of key economic and social sectors.
This thesis will concentrate on the structural adjustment
program (SAP), although stabilization and adjustment complement
one another and are therefore strongly correlated.
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The SAP has been supported by a series of IMF stand-by
arrangements (for the rescheduling of official and commercial debts)
and sectoral adjustment loans. Structural reforms were initiated in
the trade and industrial sector, and in the agricultural sector. Other
sectoral adjustment operations have involved education and the
health sector. In addition, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies
were imposed to eliminate the imbalance between aggregate
domestic demand and resource availability. These reforms have
entailed cuts in public investment programs; reduction in consumer
subsidies; and credit restraint. The social implications of these
measures are reviewed in this chapter.
B. The Costs of Adjustment
Today, for most countries in Africa and Latin America,
"adjustment policy is the dominating economic preoccupation for
setting the frame and constraints within which all other economic
and development issues have to be considered" (Cornia et. al.,1987:
5).
However, against a background of severe deterioration in social
and economic conditions, questions have been raised about the
impact of adjustment programs on the poor, and about the ability of
governments and international agencies to protect the poor in the
process of adjustment
The consequences of adjustment for the poorest of the poor
have been of growing interest in recent years. The implications for
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poverty are controversial; they will be examined throughout the
chapter.
Before presenting an analysis of the relationship between
structural adjustment and the distribution of income, it is useful to
outline the main features affecting distributional patterns in LDCs.
Briefly, these are: (1) technological and institutional dualism; (2)
limited access of lower-income groups to complementary assets; and
(3) differences in socio-economic behavior, especially with respect to
savings and fertility rates (Chenery et al., 1974: 210).
In addition, an interdependence exists between growth in one
socio-economic group and another. Linkages exist between the
different income groups, and those ensure that the growth of income
in one group is not simply a function of capital accumulation in that
group but also a function of growth of production and income in
other groups. Hence, the determinants of the distribution of income
cannot be separated from the determinants of growth in the
economy (Chenery et al., 1974: 218).
1. Transitional and Longer-Term Costs
In their attempts to assist the poor under structural
adjustment, policy makers have not been able to rely on theoretical
or applied economics. "Economic theory has neglected the tradeoff
between macroeconomic balances and distributional balance."
(Demery and Addison, 1987: 1). Most analyses have fallen short of
emphasizing the tradeoff in that they have failed to point out the
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unavoidability of transitional costs, as well as the strong likelihood of
longer-term costs being incurred.
A distinction must be made between transitional and long-
term costs or what Corden (1988) calls primary adjustment costs and
secondary adjustment costs.
Transitional costs are of three types (Huang and Nicholas,
1987a: 4). First, the effort to restore macroeconomic balance
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply usually depresses
output, employment and consumption. These costs are typical of a
recession. Second, the changes in the structure of incentives
stimulate the reallocation of resources and hence benefits between
sectors and activities. Consequently, the groups that previously
benefited from subsidies and other forms of protection from -market
forces will suffer substantial declines in income and wealth, while
those in stimulated activities benefit. Third, transitional costs are
also incurred when lags and difficulties in moving productive
resources into alternative uses, in response to change in relative
prices arise.
As for long-term costs, these result from prolonged
unemployment and output losses that may be caused by failure to
devalue sufficiently, by real wage resistance, or by inappropriate use
of import restrictions. These factors reflect inefficiency in
adjustment and result in the economy operating below capacity.
Hence the poorest segments of society may not benefit from the
adjustment process. With adjustment proving to be a longer and
more arduous effort than originally expected, the benefits of growth
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are less certain. They take longer to materialize, and reach the poor
only to the limited extent that trickle down occurs. The relationship
between adjustment and poverty therefore extends beyond a notion
of social cost that features only short-term effects. (Demery and
Addison, 1987: 1)
2. Structural Adjustment and the Distribution of Income
Economists know very little about distributional consequences
of these policies in developing countries. Dethier, given the
importance of the topic, calls this a "scandalous omission" (1986: 19).
The answer is not easy to arrive at because social costs are often
indistinguishable from the external factors that necessitated the
adjustment as well as internal factors such as social deprivation that
arise from the extensive poverty of the country in question.
In assessing the social costs of adjustment programs, the focus
is on the welfare of the poor. That segment of society is defined as
the poorest 30 to 40 percent of the population in per capita income
or consumption and its characteristics have been presented in
Chapter I, section C. The focus is therefore on poor farmers; the
landless; unskilled labor; and women and children in low-income
households.
Based on the stabilization cum-structural adjustment package,
the various channels through which the poor are affected are
presented below, with a focus on the distributional effects of the
following measures:
(1) trade and exchange rate system
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(2) tax structure
(3) agricultural pricing policies
(4) social sector programs
(5) monetary and fiscal policies
(6) wages and administered prices
This "list" follows Huang and Nicholas (1987a).
2.1 Distributional effects of trade policy reforms
Following the balance of payment crisis of 1983, the Moroccan
Government began to reorient its industry and trade strategy from
inward looking development based on import substitution, with
extensive state intervention and major public sector projects, to one
designed to promote exports and efficient import substitution with
greater reliance on the private sector (CEM, 1987:14). So far,
substantial efforts have been made to reduce the average import
tariff rate and disparities in protection with the aim to (1) reduce
present distortions in resource allocation and import licensing, (2)
remove quantitative restrictions (QRs) and import licensing, and (3)
to eliminate export duties and simplify trade procedures. In
addition, a more flexible exchange rate policy was adopted which
allowed for the devaluation of the Dirham. Devaluation was
undertaken in order to correct an overvalued exchange rate, the
legacy of the short-lived price boom in phosphate. More generally,
devaluation is included in the package of reforms in order to
improve tradability and the current account through an
"expenditure-switching" process.
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Accompanying these policies is a less interventionist approach
on the part of the government. Indeed, in1985, twelve years after
the Moroccanization of the economy, the newly appointed
government announced "a determined policy of denationalization
and of returning to the private sector everything that naturally
belongs to it."
In 1987, Morocco became an official contracting party to the
GATT, thereby reaffirming the economy's orientation towards
increased liberalization.
The short-run implications of trade liberalization and currency
devaluation measures are recognized to be adverse, entailing a loss
of output, a decline in spending, and an increase in unemployment.
In Morocco, where almost half of the poor population is located in
urban areas, devaluation imposed immediate costs (in terms of lower
levels of income and consumption) on the urban poor who are locked
in the production of nontradables, or engaged in nontradable
activities such as construction, utilities, services and informal sector
activities. The decrease in the relative price of nontradables also
hurt farmers growing non-exported crops. Improved price
incentives did not prove to be more successful for the rest of the
farmers. Given that poor farmers are barely served by infrastructure
services such as irrigation and transportation, they face capacity
constraints which prevent them from increasing output in response
to higher prices. These farmers suffer even further because
adjustment involves fiscal restraint which translates into lower
spending for infrastructure development.
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Moreover, devaluation was ineffective in improving the plight
of the rural poor because land ownership is still highly concentrated
(in the 1970s, almost 75% of farming families still owned no land as
barely two percent of the land was distributed to the farmers).
Hence, increased producer prices on export crops have no effect on
the landless who cannot cultivate them, instead the implications for
the poor may be severe if they are consumers of these crops.
Consumers in both the rural and urban sectors were hurt by
increases in the prices of goods (triggered by escalating intermediate
input costs) and the poor were the most vulnerable to the increase in
those of food. In addition as real wages of workers in the
nontradable sector and in formerly heavily protected industries
declined relative to those in the tradable sector, it was once more the
poorest segments that were the worst off.
Finally, given that the nontradable goods sector is labor-
intensive, workers laid-off in that sector were not able to find
employment in the tradable sector which is more capital-intensive.
However, those workers that were absorbed by the tradable sector
benefited from higher wages and greater job security.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund claim
that these costs, although unavoidable, are only transitional in
nature. However, Huang and Nicholas (1987a: 35) identify several
factors that combine to prolong the period of transition. Most
important are the following:
. Price and wage rigidities which render the reallocation
process lengthier and the unemployment problem more
severe.
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. Even under conditions where relative prices do change, the
expenditure-switching process may be slow. This may be
because exports are at full productive capacity, or because
the supply by farmers is unresponsive to price increases.
- Finally, when the export sector is monopolistic, a price
increase may not have a full effect on production.
Orthodox economists insist that in the long-run, the
liberalization of trade leads to increased efficiency gains, which in
turn increase income for the population as a whole. Moreover, they
believe that devaluation is a necessary measure of austerity which,
in the long-run is justified by the positive effects it has on the
economy through the "restructuring of incentives." In fact, they
regard exchange rate action as the single most important policy
instrument of structural adjustment. It is a principal element of
"getting the prices right".
The structuralist riposte is that the only reason such policies
may work is because of the changes that occur in the distribution of
income as a result of forced savings and of relative price changes.
Taylor (1988) argues that efficiency gains (or the "little triangle"
welfare gains) from trade liberalization are "trivial" as Harberger
discovered in 1959. They amount to a small fraction of GDP and
hence fail to compensate for the costs that such a procedure incurs.
With respect to devaluation, the structuralist consensus is that,
although it does, in the short-run, reduce the trade deficit through
economic contraction, it carries severe implications for the poor in
the longer term. Devaluation affects the poor through three main
channels. First are the price effects which are the result of increasing
intermediate import costs. Second is a stagflationary effect, which
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occurs especially when the export response is weak, and can develop
into an excessive contraction or "overkill" when the devaluation is
accompanied by monetary restraint (as is the case in Morocco).
Finally are the wage and employment effects. The behavior of
employment has been significantly affected by the evolution of real
wages which have been negatively impacted by the devaluation. The
result is a shift in the income distribution towards groups with a
higher propensity to save.
The World Bank however argues that the social costs of lower
real wages and reduced purchasing power have been in part
compensated by the positive employment effects, which followed the
decline in real wages, especially as production shifted to more labor-
intensive, exporting activities.
Given that in Morocco employment is a politically more
sensitive issue that wage levels, it is understandable that this
positive employment effect has been highlighted, as it ensures that
the continuation of the adjustment program is more "palatable"
politically. In reality, however, the adjustment and stabilization
period has been characterized by open unemployment, mostly in
urban areas, for women and young adults. In 1986 unemployment
was at 9.3% accompanied by estimates of the total labor force in the
informal sector ranging from 30% to 76%.
Moreover, the jobs that have been created between 1982 and
1986 have been mostly characterized by low wages and
productivity; and whatever increase in employment has been
attributed to the adjustment program is more a reflection of
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seasonality. Indeed, during the 1980s, the share of temporary jobs
(likely to be causally related to poverty) in total employment
increased, mainly in the services sector, transport, urban
construction sites, and government work camps. Ennaji writes:
"part-time work is no novelty, nor is it a Moroccan speciality, but it
has become more and more typical of the labor situation in Morocco
in the last fifteen years or so" (1986: 45). These conditions have
been further exacerbated by the falling trend in real wages.
Finally, "the ratio of economic benefits to political opposition
engendered by trade and exchange rate policies can be very small...,
rendering the reforms unsustainable" (Rodrik, 1988: 29). Indeed
these reforms are threatened by the growing opposition of certain
domestic interest groups to further trade liberalization, as well as
increasing world protectionism illustrated in part by the increasingly
difficult conditions of access to European Community markets which
in the past have absorbed 60 percent of Morocco's exports, and the
pressing need to narrow the budget deficit in the face of structural
revenue constraints. However, sustained support of trade policy
reform by the government has been the determinant factor ensuring
the successful implementation of the liberalization program. A World
Bank report writes: "In the context of the overall implementation of
trade policy reform, Morocco has arguably become one of the more
liberal trade regimes within the developing world." (SAL, 1988: 4)
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2.2 Distributional Effects of Tax Adjustments
Tax reforms in Morocco aim at achieving three objectives: (1)
to increase the level of revenues to the Treasury; (2) to harmonize
the tax system with the other objectives of improving the efficiency
of resource allocation and in particular with trade liberalization; and
(3) to ensure that the "tax burden" is shared in an equitable way
across the population groups." (Mateus, 1988: 73)
The effect of tax reforms on poverty and equity is a major
consideration because of their highly visible impact on the incomes
of vulnerable groups. Most studies express difficulties in analyzing
who actually pays the tax. A tax levied on a producer may be passed
forward on to the consumer though higher prices or backward to
factors of production.
Studies on the redistributive effects of tax systems have shown
the overall impact to be modest. In the short-run, the immediate
effect of a tax is the change in the purchasing power of existing
income either through changed income levels (direct tax) or through
changed price levels of commodities purchased with the income
(indirect taxes). Hence, direct taxes tend to influence the decision to
save, and therefore also the long-run growth of the economy. As for
indirect taxes, they may alter the size of (pre-tax) income, as factors
are reallocated away from heavily taxed activities, thereby affecting
production and hence factor returns. In general, however, tax
policies are not a particularly suitable instrument for alleviating
poverty. In Morocco, most of the rural poor remain untouched by the
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tax system because their incomes are too small to be taxed and their
consumption basket comprises largely untaxed goods.
Corporate tax rates on profits and personal income taxes paid
by the higher income groups were lowered twice between 1987 and
1988. These measures are not expected to significantly affect the
poverty situation of the poor; however they will adversely impact
the distribution of income. On the other hand, also in the context of
the adjustment program, several direct tax measures were
undertaken that were supportive of a more equal distribution of
income. First, there was a broadening of the tax base; second the
zero-bracket threshold applied to the personal income tax was raised
from DH 6,000 to DH 8,400 (in response to the fiscally regressive
impact of inflation on low-income groups) (SAL, 1988: 11) and a
movement toward the elimination from the tax base of a larger
number of low-income tax payers (whose contribution is already
minimal) is underway. Additional measures that provided
possibilities for a more equitable taxation system included the
taxation of the real estate (immovable property especially land) and
agriculture (especially large farms), sectors that in the past had been
exempt of taxation. The Budgetary law for 1988 further repealed
certain exemptions that had been allowed for some financial
institutions.
Indirect taxes in the form of a Value Added Tax (VAT) were
introduced on goods and services in 1986. Although they have
proved to be a sizable generator of revenues, they have affected
distribution in an adverse manner. More recently, exemptions from
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VAT have been eliminated on a number of products in order to
widen the tax base, and in the effort to reduce dispersion, rates have
been increased on such items as coffee, rice, cattle feed, and
transportation services with the expected negative implications for
both the rural and urban poor.
These indirect taxes have a more immediate effect on lower
income groups because they change the prices of goods in the
consumption basket. Moreover, taxes on consumption tend to be
regressive because a larger proportion of the incomes of the poor is
spent on consumption.
The orthodox view argues that such efforts are usually partly
counteracted by the prevailing use of tax exemptions for basic
necessities consumed by the poor; that whatsmore consumption
taxes are usually restricted to processed goods, so their regressive
effect is more diluted the poorer and more rural-based the economy.
In Morocco, however, almost 50% of the poor are urban based and
consume a large share of manufactured and processed products,
hence they do feel the tax burden more than their counterparts in
sub-Saharan Africa who consume mostly home-produced or untaxed
products for cottage industries. (Huang, 1976)
If more explicit emphasis is placed on distributional issues,
indirect tax measures would include a general broad-based tax on
goods and services, higher differential rates of tax on goods and
services consumed by higher-income households, such as cars,
petrol, alcohol and tobacco, household "white goods," electricity,
telecommunications, hotels, restaurants and air travel. These taxes,
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because on selective goods and services that are generally highly
income elastic, have a favorable impact on income distribution,
though by themselves they do not improve the poverty situation.
Of the tax measures affecting trade, the rationalization of the
tariff structure as well as the reduction of exemptions have proved
to be important in increasing revenue. The net impact of import
duties on household incomes depends on consumption patterns for
the commodities being taxed. In general, households in higher
income groups tend to consumer more imports and more "luxury"
goods that carry higher tax rates, than do lower income households.
Hence higher income classes tend to pay more taxes and higher
rates. Moreover, with the replacement of QRs by tariffs, importers
who usually belong to higher income groups will enjoy lower
economic rent, with the government receiving increased revenues.
These measures affecting trade, besides raising revenue, may
contribute to an improved distribution of income. It must be
remembered, however, as noted previously, that reduced
exemptions may adversely affect poverty groups to the extent that
import items (such as flour and edible oils) are part of their
consumption basket. As for reductions in tariffs on luxury items, the
inevitable results is a worsening of the distribution of income.
Finally, the strengthening of existing institutions and
rationalizing of tax administration efforts that are being undertaken
in parallel to the structural reform in the fiscal system (to be
covered later in the chapter), may result in the improvement of
equity in the long-run, especially as it concentrates on tax evasion
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which is substantial for the higher-income groups. However, such a
policy requires commitment on the part of staff and officials and can
take years to implement. A study by the Fiscal Affairs department
of the IMF concludes that: "while improved tax administration is
desirable, it cannot be relied on as a short-run solution to a problem
of insufficient revenues, and for this reason it is unlikely to have a
significant redistributional impact in fund programs" (IMF, 1986:
15).
2.3 Distributional Effects of Agricultural Pricing Policies
The ingredients of the agricultural prices and incentives reform
as described by Mateus (1988: 74) include the following: (1) external
trade liberalization across the sector, lifting prohibitions and other
quantitative restrictions on exports and imports, and instituting a
small effective protection rate across all subsectors; (2) liberalization
of domestic markets in grains; (3) gradual elimination of consumer
subsidies and expansion of direct food aid programs to compensate
the urban poor; (4) freeing crop systems in irrigated areas in order
to better respond to market price signals (this would entail a drop in
sugar production, a crop heavily subsidized by the government); and
(5) progressive elimination of input subsidies, especially on
fertilizers and water.
The World Bank argues that the above reform is essential to
counteract the anti-agricultural bias that characterizes past policies
established by the government which include output taxes, low
procurement prices, and macroeconomic and exchange rate policies
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that reduce producer incentives. As for food and inputs subsidies,
the Bank states that both result in lower income as well as lower
incentives for the poor, rather than helping the poor and promoting
equity.
The argument is that lower producer prices impede
agricultural growth by reducing returns to labor and capital in
agriculture thus inhibiting the discovery and adoption of new
technologies that would result in lower cost production functions and
agricultural growth. Moreover, subsidies on flour, made in large part
from imported grain, have depressed agricultural prices of local
cereal grain, much of which is not marketed through government
channels, but which competes with subsidized flour. This is thought
to have been responsible for much of the terms of trade
disadvantage of the agricultural sector (CEM, 1987: 21). In addition,
the poor are hurt by low producer prices in two ways, first indirectly
through the reduction in growth (this is assuming that growth will
eventually have trickle down effects) and more directly through the
fall in the real incomes of households, mostly rural for whom food is
not only a commodity item but also a source of revenue.
Even though increased producer prices do stimulate
agricultural production, their distributional implications cannot be
ignored. The IMF writes: "Few policies undertaken under fund-
supported programs receive as much critical attention as reductions
in budgetary subsidies through increases in the prices of basic
goods" (IMF, 1986: 27). The basic good relevant to this section is
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food. In section 2.6 of this chapter, subsidies on other basic goods
such as petroleum and electricity will be reviewed.
In Morocco, as in other countries, low prices for food symbolize
in part the government's commitment to protect the lower-income
classes. In the early 1980s, the government spent 10% of its
recurrent expenditure on basic foodstuffs (cereals, sugar, edible oils,
milk, butter and petroleum products) in order to cover the price
increase that was triggered by the devaluation and the commodity
price boom. This figure corresponds to 31% of total government
social spending, making food subsidies the second largest component
of government provisions behind education and ahead of health. The
rates of subsidy in flour and edible oils (that are in large part
imported) were about 50% of import cost (Mateus, 1988: 14). By
establishing a wedge between producer prices, import prices, and
consumer prices, the government also aims at stabilizing prices (thus
reducing income fluctuations), at keeping wages down and therefore
avoiding inflation. Dethier (1986: 40) adds: "In poor countries, food
constitutes a high share of total production and consumption, and
interventions in food markets attempt to maintain ... the status quo
between interest groups involved."
In general, cuts in food subsidies will favorably affect the
income of farms that produce food, and negatively affect the income
of urban workers and the rural landless. In Morocco, the poor
population is mostly constituted of urban laborers and the rural
landless, hence the cuts in food subsidies introduced in January 1984
had immediate adverse repercussions on the well-being of the poor.
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In fact, five months after the measures had been adopted,
movements of social unrest and widespread riots broke out.
Student-based protests began in Marrakesh and spread to five
northern cities, with substantial participation of adults from the
poorer neighborhoods. "The same economic and political grievances
were everywhere apparent, and some protesters carried banners
denouncing (King) Hassan personally" (Tessler, 1985: 46). In addition
to the increase in food prices, these movements broke out in
response to the decrease in real income and recessionary effects of
these price increases.
The question is therefore: why does economic adjustment
require increases in the prices of goods that are so directly
associated with consumer well-being?
Besides the fact that such a policy entails positive effects on
the government deficit (through decreased expenditures) and the
balance of payments (through decreased demand for food imports),
the general argument based on several studies undertaken by the
World Bank and the IMF is that most food subsidies are directed
toward the urban sector, whereas the majority of the poor
population lives in rural area. This is not the case of Morocco where
the spacial distribution of the poor is almost equal between the
urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, it is estimated that only 16% of
the subsidies actually benefit the bottom 30% of the population. In
addition, it may be true that while rural hunger may be more
severe, urban hunger is more visible and therefore more politically
dangerous. Most countries have found that upper income groups
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tend to appropriate an excessive share of food subsidies, and that
the urban and politically more articulate groups benefit
disproportionately (Dethier, 1987: 40). Whatsmore, it is specifically
these groups that are more likely to speak out and threaten
retaliation, rather than rural agricultural workers who are too
unorganized, are often not qualified for the benefits, or may even, as
in the case of the ultra-poor, be unaffected by the program
modification because they do not have the purchasing power to buy
certain food products, even at subsidized prices.
However, this distributional pattern of the benefits of food
subsidies does not imply that the removal of these subsidies will
have no effect on low-income households. Because these households'
consumption basket is mainly comprised of food, with a larger share
of income spent on cereals than any other food, a cut in subsidies
may entail very adverse effects on the standard of living of the poor.
The long-run effect of cuts in food subsidies depend on how
the measure will affect the general level of activity, that is how
those changes in nominal income affect demand for non-agricultural
goods, prices and real incomes. Taylor (1983: 195) writes: following
cuts in food subsidies "demand for food products will fall, leading to
a decline in either imports or the internal producer's price (or both).
There may be a spillover into demand for non-agricultural goods,
leading to overall output contraction. Once again, a foreign balance
improvement is obtained at the cost of reduced economic activity
and a price-induced shift in the income distribution against the poor,
who devote a large share of their spending to food."
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Moreover, programs that provide subsidized food to urban
unskilled labor can in part explain the constant migration of
unskilled workers from the country-side and the resulting decrease
in urban wages.
The consensus is that most of these problems can be avoided
through targeting selectively to vulnerable households, based on
income, location, health and nutrition status. Improved targeting can
be achieved by concentrating subsidies on food items consumed
primarily by the poor.
Alternative food compensatory programs will be explored in
Chapter III. The design of an effective system has become urgent as
the government plans to entirely eliminate subsidies by 1990.
With respect to input subsidies, fertilizer is the most
widespread in Morocco. Because fertilizer provides higher
incremental yield on irrigated land, farmers that benefit most from
irrigation are the ones that benefit from fertilizer subsidies.
Moreover, in the case of rationing of subsidized fertilizer, the
allocation will be biased in favor of the larger farmers. Furthermore,
with increased emphasis on fertilizer-intensive crops, labor is
gradually substituted by fertilizer, and the landless are the worst hit.
Meanwhile as the availability of non-fertilizer - intensive crops
(mostly cereals) decreases, so does the consumption or calorie-intake
of the rural poor.
Producer subsidies have been used in irrigation and sugar
production not only as agricultural inputs but also to stimulate the
livestock subsector, and for exports. Producer incentives aim at
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promoting agriculture, a "priority" sector as well as promoting
certain types of production. In addition, investment subsidies in
irrigated agriculture aim at promoting investment in that sector and
speeding its recovery.
While these subsidies may be motivated by the belief that poor
farmers need protection and income transfers, the distributional
pattern of subsidized credit or water, like other subsidized inputs,
again favors the relatively few well-off and politically influential
groups.
A drop in sugar production (a crop heavily subsidized by the
government), and the reduction in input subsidies (particularly
fertilizer) - two components of the policy reforms in agriculture -
will lead to an increase in costs of production thus adversely
affecting farmers. However, to the extent that these cuts would also
lead to a reduction in the production of fertilizer-intensive crops,
and a freeing of government resources to be used for improving
existing systems, further expanding irrigation facilities and
increasing supplies of complementary inputs, poor farmers may end
up benefiting to a greater degree from government resources.
Moreover, to the extent that a reduction in these input subsidies is
likely to decrease mostly the income of the upper income class it will
narrow the income differential between the poor and the relatively
well-off.
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2.4 Distributional Effect of the Provision of Social Services
In the effort to reduce public expenditures, the Moroccan
government has significantly curtailed public expenditures on the
social sector.
In 1985, total government expenditures on social services in
Morocco accounted for about 10% of GDP, and the share of social
expenditure in total government outlays of that same year was 29%.
These figures are comparable with those of Brazil and are slightly
higher than those of Mexico and Korea.
The high priority generally given to public outlays on social
services is justified on grounds of welfare and equity. In Morocco,
total social outlays, as well as per capita expenditure decreased
severely in 1983, 1984, and 1985 as a result of the stabilization-
cum-adjustment policy adopted in 1983, after having continuously
risen between 1978 and 1982. This translated into a reduction of
real per capita expenditures on social services by 12% p.a. during
1983-1985, compared to a real per capita GDP growth of 0.4% p.a.
during the same period (WB, 1988: 6).
The orthodox view is that underinvestment in social services
may also be the result of restrictions on private sector participation
and the pervasive use of public subsidies which, it is believed,
distorts incentives. Another plausible reason advanced is the belief
that resources are not necessarily allocated to activities with the
highest social rates of return. This mistargeting is present in
Morocco within sectors and within programs. Mistargeting within
sectors is characterized by spending on programs that are unlikely to
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benefit the poor, especially in public education and health. In the
education sector, minimal funds have been devoted to primary
education and literary programs important for the poor, while 63%
of total education expenditures were allocated to higher and
secondary education in 1985. Moreover, disparities in educational
participation are noticeable between genders and among geographic
areas, with women and the poor constituting the groups most
suffering from "educational poverty."
The poor have also suffered from mistargeting in the health
sector where most of the spending has been devoted to high cost
curative care, at the expense of preventive care, which is more likely
to benefit the poor. The allocation of resources is also highly biased
towards urban regions, thus draining resources away from the less
developed, rural areas. In sum, the health sector suffers from, first
an internal inefficiency problem, reflected by the inappropriate
distribution of health care professionals, medical supplies and drugs,
particularly in rural areas; and second an equity problem, as the
poor have benefited little from public spending.
This pattern of spending not only does not benefit the poor as
much as intended, but it also creates second order negative effects.
The concentration of government spending in urban areas makes it
difficult to develop facilities in the country-side (WB, 1988).
Mistargeting also occurs within programs, the foremost
example being that of food subsidies which accrue to the high
income groups, as has already been noted earlier in this chapter.
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The implications of the trends and levels of per capita social
expenditure on the standard of living of poor households can be
related to a number of issues (WB, 1988). These are: (1) how the
intersectoral allocations relate to the hierarchical structure of the
overall needs of the poor households, (2) whether the magnitude of
the social expenditure matches the basic needs of these households,
and (3) how cost efficient the production and distribution of social
services is. These issues are examined further below.
With respect to the structure of government social spending,
the intersectoral allocation of social expenditures in Morocco appears
to favor education over nutrition and health. The largest share in
total government social expenditures, higher than 45%, has been
spent on education between 1978 and 1986. During that same
period, the second largest component of public social spending was
on food subsidies, which in 1985 accounted for 31% of the total.
Health was the third largest component, amounting to 7% of the total
in 1985. During the period between 1978 and 1985, the shares of
education and health declined considerably, partly as a result of the
significant increase of the share of food subsidies after 1973, but
also because of resource constraints. The smallest components of
public social spending were housing and employment creation
programs which accounted for only 2% of the total or less.
In the future, there will be a growing need for more efficient
and equitable health, nutrition and compensatory employment
programs. This will be elaborated on in Chapter III.
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With respect to the magnitude of public spending on social
programs, it is clear that it does not match the basic needs of poor
households. Performance evaluations of the overall education
delivery system in Morocco, by Bank staff show that the current
levels of educational services are insufficient to serve the whole
population, because of the lack of facilities and/or appropriate
equipment, and personnel. Despite progress made since the start of
the Education Reform Program, overall participation in primary and
secondary education in Morocco is lower than in countries with
similar income, with 56% of children between the ages of 7 and 12
living in rural areas having limited access to primary schools.
Moreover, the overwhelming prevalence of adult illiteracy in poor
households attests to the inadequacies of the educational delivery
system. However, it is not clear whether these inadequacies are due
to insufficient levels of public expenditures - as Morocco's share of
education in total government outlays compares favorably with the
average of other low middle-income countries - or whether they are
due to cost inefficient spending of such funds.
With respect to health, indicators as well as other empirical
findings suggest that current levels of health services fail to meet
the basic needs of the population, especially those of the poor. In
Morocco, 60% of the rural population has no access to basic care,
because of such factors as lack of facilities, distance, inadequate
transportation means, and financial, social and educational barriers.
The nutritional status is more strongly correlated with adjustment
and consequently has suffered more from the decline in per capita
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social expenditure since 1983, than did other health indicators. (In
fact, IMR and life expectancy improved despite the recession and the
adjustment program.)
The level of government expenditures on health still compares
poorly with countries with the same and even lower per capita
income. It can therefore be argued, despite the question of cost
efficiency in the provision of health services, that the level of public
spending on health in Morocco is insufficient.
Regarding the cost inefficiency of the production and
distribution of social services (the third issue raised by the social
sector strategy), it is attributable first to the inadequate
management of infrastructure, such as technology, and second to the
over-centralization of the provision of social services. Foremost, cost
inefficiency has been identified as resulting from the great degree of
dispersion of the population into small and scattered settlements in
rural areas. This dispersion implies unequal access to public services,
especially education and health. In general the Central and Western
regions (which contain the largest urban concentrations in the
country) are the better served. There are fewer than 10,000
inhabitants per doctor in these two regions, as opposed to more than
20,000 in other regions such as the South and Tensift. Hence, even if
social services were subsidized, the rural inhabitants have to incur
the costs of transportation and the opportunity cost of time securing
these services. Because of these costs the poor may value and use
health and education services less than higher income groups do,
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especially if they do not consider them essential for their survival
(H&N, 1987a: 43).
The above issues, namely underinvestment, mistargeting and
high cost inefficiency in the provision of social services suggest that
the income redistributional effects of government expenditures will
be negligible or even negative.
As for the distributional effects of cuts in the provision of
social services, particularly of health, nutrition and education, they
can be severe for the poorer beneficiaries who lack the savings to
pay for alternative services. Such cuts would therefore negatively
affect the human capital of poverty groups.
Even if the adjustment effort requires fiscal austerity, the
access to social services for the poor should be maintained possibly
financed by freed resources accumulated from improved targeting.
Efforts to this effect will be discussed in the following chapter.
2.5. Distributional Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
"(Monetarist policy is) simply a campaign against the standard
of life of the working classes (operating through) the deliberate
intensification of unemployment ... by using the weapon of economic
necessity against individuals and against particular industries" (J.M.
Keynes as quoted in Dethier 1986: 12).
The Moroccan adjustment program includes one, a variety of
contractionary monetary and fiscal measures designed to curtail
excess demand in the economy; and two actions for the liberalization
of the financial sector.
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Both contractionary monetary and fiscal measures control the
fiscal deficit as an instrument to curb public sector borrowing and
thereby restrain demand. The Moroccan government exerts
monetary restraint through high reserve requirements and by
imposing ceilings on bank credit, the latter as part of the
stabilization measures agreed with the IMF. At the same time, the
government is relaxing other constraints on the financial sector such
as the tight regulation of interest rates, these have now been raised
to positive levels; and the restrictions on the functions of specialized
public sector institutions, which are now allowed to compete with
commercial banks in mobilizing deposits and in lending. However
other restrictions remain. These are related to legislation and the
market structure. The medium-term goal is to identify these
obstacles and remove them in order to increase competitiveness and
diversify financial instruments and thereby improve the financial
sector's effectiveness.
The orthodox view argues that failing to curb monetary growth
in the presence of a fiscal deficit can accelerate inflation, the costs of
which are mostly borne by the poor who typically pay most of the
inflation tax. The poor are the least able to protect their real
incomes (through the indexation of their wages) and their assets (by
moving into real or foreign assets to avoid taxation).
Structuralist theory on the other hand argues that it is the
policy curbing monetary growth itself which exerts inflationary
pressures by pushing up interest rates. However, "interest rate cost-
push is left out of standard models, which inevitably show monetary
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contraction to be anti-inflationary (Taylor, 1983: 7). Moreover, given
that such a policy mainly operates through restraining aggregate
demand, it often results in a loss in growth and employment which
inevitably hurts the poor.
If unemployment affects unskilled labor more than skilled
labor as it usually does, the net effect of monetary contraction is
likely to be an increase in poverty.
Restrictive monetary policy can also affect the distribution of
income over time, through changes in the distribution of assets. Due
to interest rates control and scarce funds as a result of monetary
restrictions, loans in the formal banking sector tend to be allocated
to the larger, more established firms, and to consumers and
producers in the urban sector. Relatively smaller firms and rural
entities may have to use informal "curb" markets for their credit
needs. This pattern of allocation places the smaller firms at a
disadvantage and leads to potential bankruptcy and asset
concentration. However, poorest cultivations are exposed to a lesser
extent to the effects of a monetary contraction as the loans they
receive are mostly in kind such as seed and fertilizer.
The IMF ( Heller et al.,1988: 15) advocates the liberalization of
the financial market (which involves raising interest rates,
decreasing market fragmentation, and increasing competition) in
order to correct the bias is favor of larger firms and urban sectors.
By facilitating access to credit markets for all, this process allows the
poor, engaged in either small-scale enterprises in the informal sector
or in small farms in the rural sector, to expand their productive
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capacity and increase their participation in the process of economic
development and structural adjustment. However, given that the
poor cannot offer collateral, they will remain risky customers
regardless of the level of interest rates. Moreover, historical
experience has shown that extreme liberalization (accompanied by
speculation) can lead to capital flight which in turn can result in
financial collapse.
An equally if not more significant distributional concern is the
distributional effects of cuts in public expenditure. Fiscal adjustment
efforts often lead to reduced capital expenditure which results in
decreased employment opportunities and a slowing down of future
economic growth. Consequently, output, consumption and investment
are also affected because the marginal productivity of labor and
private capital is directly affected.
During the past two decades, the development strategy has
remained the same, mainly consisting of heavy investment in
irrigation in agriculture, the development of "forward-linkages" in
the phosphate sector, and the build-up of material infrastructure.
However, by 1987, the rate of public investment had dropped to
21.1% as compared to a peak of 34.2% in 1977 during the phosphate
price boom. In fact, besides suffering from the adverse economic
conditions which characterized the early 1980s, public investment
has taken much of the brunt of the fiscal adjustment in the past,
with government investment being curtailed to the point that real
expenditures declined by over 50% between 1981 and 1986.
Moreover, while the adjustment and liberalization efforts
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undertaken by the Government since the 1983 crisis sought and
obtained a higher share of private investment in total gross fixed
capital formation (GFCF), rising from 12.9% in 1982 to 16.6% in 1986,
the level of public investment has fallen below the minimum
necessary to meet the development needs of the private sector and
the social needs of the population, particularly the economically
disadvantaged (SAL, 1988: 13). Hence the narrowing of the fiscal
deficit from 12.2% of GDP in 1983 to 6.0% of GDP in 1987 has been
achieved, in large part at the expense of public investment. As a
result, many suspensions and even cancellations of investments in
key economic and social sectors continue to threaten future growth
and the development of human capital.
The potentially deleterious long-term effects of cutbacks in the
health and education sectors on the human capital of the most
vulnerable groups has already been covered in a previous section.
Cutbacks in other areas, such as infrastructural operations and
maintenance have equally severe ramifications for the poor. Low-
levels of investment in infrastructural projects that are
characteristically labor intensive (such as construction) affect the
poor through decreased demand for low-skilled labor (which
translates itself into lower wages and even unemployment), and by
contributing to the deterioration of the infrastructure which is
detrimental to the value of the assets owned by the poor.
The government maintains however that it is committed to
mitigating the hardship to the poor caused by the present economic
difficulties by redesigning its programs so as to reduce their high
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costs to the budget, and by directing them more effectively to the
really poor. A significant part of the current economic problems are
attributable to the planning, allocation, and management of public
sector resources, as illustrated in the design and execution of the
1981-85 plan which suffered from the lack of adequate project
appraisal and hence failed to match growth objectives with available
resources. As previously stated, an increase in the level and
efficiency of public investment expenditures is a major component of
the adjustment program. It is reflected in the Target Investment
Program (TIP) formulated by the Moroccan government in
consultation with the World Bank, on the basis of growth objectives,
sectoral priorities, and identified projects in the 1988-1992 plan.
2.6 Distributional Effects of Adjustment in Wages and
Administered Prices
Reforms in administered prices (through the reduction in
subsidies and the elimination of price controls) and in the structure
of wages are integral components of the Moroccan adjustment
program.
Liberalizing price controls is expected to improve the financial
position of the public sector as well as promote efficiency in the
allocation of resources, but it also clearly has distributional
consequences.
As has been already covered, the rationalization of agricultural
prices proved to be one of the politically more sensitive areas of the
government's structural adjustment program. Other dismantling of
price control efforts have involved the energy sector.
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The rationale for reducing and eventually eliminating
petroleum and electricity subsidies is the elimination of inefficient
energy use (which, in the case of petroleum would relieve the
foreign reserve shortages that are significant in Morocco). Moreover,
eliminating such subsidies would discourage resource allocation bias
in favor of energy-intensive and labor-saving technology which
leads to the unemployment of unskilled, low-income laborers.
In addition to avoiding the above employment effects, it is
argued that allowing energy prices to reflect the opportunity cost to
the country, may improve the distribution of income because it taxes
the rich for whom the consumption of energy is substantial, that of
poverty groups being insignificant. However, increases in petroleum
prices are inevitably translated into higher transportation costs of
goods, which in turn are reflected in higher prices of goods, thus
affecting all income groups, but mostly the poor.
With respect to reforms in the structure of wages, Morocco has
directed wage control measures specifically at the public sector, in
the effort to reduce the government budget deficit. This is because
personnel expenditures constitutes the main cost in the recurrent
budget, having risen from 8.5% of GDP in 1970 to 16% in the early
eighties, and are now around 11% of GDP. Moreover, the number of
civil servants increased from 278,000 in 1970, to 584,000 in 1984
and by 1986 reached 604,000 (CEM, 1987: 16).
Structuralists believe that, "freezing of wage demands is
(included in orthodox packages) to cut inflationary pressure and
perhaps shift the income distribution (through forced savings)
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towards high-saving profit recipients and the upper class" (Taylor
1983: 191).
As a result of a wage restraint policy limiting salary increases
to the lower end of the scale, government workers have experienced
a substantial decline in their purchasing power, the real income
having decreased over the last three years. Today, as a result of its
intervention in the labor market, the government is faced with a
decline in productivity, and pressures on the budget placed by pent
up salary demands which can prevent the allocation of budget
resources for supplies and services needed to allow the personnel to
operate effectively.
In addition when government workers are much underpaid, as
they are in Morocco compared with their counterparts in the private
sector, it becomes difficult to attract skilled and competent
employees, (instead widespread corruption prevails), and hence a
lower quality of services is provided to the low-income groups. In
response to pressure, the government announced a 10% increase in
civil servants' salaries which was made effective beginning of
January 1989.
Releasing redundant workers is politically difficult, instead, the
Moroccan government has adopted a law in 1983 eliminating jobs in
the education sector that are vacated by retirement, and this law has
been extended to other sectors. These ceilings on overall government
employment have imposed hardship on some public service
segments, but they may in the long-run improve the efficiency of
public resource allocation, and increase those resources to the
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benefit of the poor. Though how the latter is to be achieved is not
specified.
There is no easy solution for problems generated by wage
policies because of the severe financial constraints facing the
government. The World Bank (CEM, 1987: 17) suggests that the
salary structure be reassessed annually to determine the trade-off
between expanding employment and salary increases. Moreover, it
advises that in response to declining productivity, a working group
in the Ministry of Administrative Affairs should be set up to
determine how to increase productivity and introduce performance
evaluations that would replace the present system of automatic
promotion.
Having reviewed the implications for poverty of the different
policy measures, several conclusions emerge. First, the impact of the
different adjustment policies has been largely determined by
Morocco's economic and social structure, the most important
determinants of changes in distribution having been (1) institutional
factors such as the existence of trade unions, lobbies and other
politically powerful interest groups which on the whole, given their
limited influence, have cooperated with the government's reforms;
(2) the weakness of mechanisms such as wage indexation which was
responsible for the declining trend in real wage; (3) the labor-
intensity of production in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors
which meant that reforms in the production system as well as
devaluation hurt the poorest groups; (4) patterns of consumption,
with imports strongly figuring in even the poor's consumption
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basket, thus making them share in the costs of adjustment; and (5)
other features of the economy such as the large size of the
subsistence sector vis-h-vis the "modern sector."
Second, the transitional costs of adjustment may be greater in
Morocco than in low-income sub-Saharan Africa. This is because,
Morocco suffers from a greater debt burden, its land-ownership is
more concentrated and almost half the poor are low-wage urban
workers thus more vulnerable to the removal of subsidies such as
those on food and energy.
Third, most policy reforms affect the poorest groups more than
marginally. In fact, transitional costs may have longer-run
repercussions on the poor, especially if, as structuralists maintain,
the effects of orthodox policies are stagflationary. As Addison and
Demery (1987) write: adjustment policies shape development and
influence the distribution of income for years into the future. Hence
the poverty costs of adjustment are not simply a short-term
problem.
Finally, the adjustment program in Morocco (as in other
countries) has involved a trade-off between short- and long- term
economic objectives and between various social objectives. First, the
adjustment program has entailed a decline in short-term growth,
however the World Bank promises benefits in the long-run that will
cover the costs. Second, various policies have achieved external
balance at the expense of internal balance, entailing a different
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Both inflation and
unemployment have proven to be among the politically most
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sensitive issues given the policy of gradually removing subsidies,
and the high rate of employment and underemployment. Finally,
the way a policy is implemented can also involve a trade-off
between efficiency and equity. While a gradual adjustment process
helps mitigate the costs to the labor-intensive sectors and the
poorest income groups, it is argued on economic grounds, that a
quicker, more uniform adjustment is more efficient. Given economic,
social and political considerations particular to Morocco, a
compromisemust be reachedwith respect to the pace of the reforms.
Without a good balance between the different considerations, the
sustainability of the program becomes questionable.
The World Bank concludes otherwise with respect to the
distributional changes that resulted from the Structural Adjustment
Program. On balance, it finds that "the extensive reforms
implemented in 1983 have initiated a significant transformation of
Morocco's underlying economic structure without unmanageable
stress to the social fabric (SAL, 1988: 6). As for the IMF (1986: 37), it
finds that on the whole, the only measures that hurt the poor are the
ones that have increased the wealth of the upper-income groups.
Nonetheless, concern for the social impact of adjustment has evolved
since the introduction of the SAP. Moreover, it is now increasingly
believed that policies to mitigate the social costs of adjustment are
feasible without threatening the achievements of adjustment
programs. The following chapter will determine to what extent the
concern with poverty alleviation and the protection of the poor's
living standards from the negative impact of austerity measures is
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reflected in the design of the Bank-supported adjustment program.
In addition, less "orthodox" measures to safeguard the interests of
the poor during the program, and to minimize the tradeoff between
economic and social objectives will be reviewed.
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Chapter III: Policy Reformulation and
Recommendations to Protect the Poor
A. Overview
The World Bank's original purposes, as stated in its Articles of
Agreement, include "raising productivity, the standard of living and
conditions of labor." However, it was not until the early 1970s, when
it was recognized that the benefits of rapid growth of the 1950s and
1960s (in which the Bank was involved through lending to power,
transport and industry projects in relatively advanced developing
countries) had not "trickled down" to the poor, that the Bank began
to concentrate its efforts on activities that would benefit the poor
directly (Beckman, 1986: 26). Arguing that economic growth was a
prerequisite for the reduction of poverty, the Bank shifted lending to
projects designed to expand economic output while simultaneously
reducing poverty. Such projects included agriculture and rural
development which were directed to the rural poor, while other
projects such as slum-upgrading and low-income housing focused on
urban poverty.
However, with the economic turbulences of the 1970s and
early 1980s, the World Bank turned its attention to helping countries
cope with the debt crisis. These pressures led to a decline in the
share of bank activity specifically directed toward the reduction of
poverty. As a result, "critics have charged that, (in the process), the
Bank (has) retreated from its poverty mandate" (Beckman, 1986:
26).
As for the IMF, it has generally maintained that distributional
issues are primarily an internal political concern. "This stance has led
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some observers to suggest that Fund-supported adjustment
programs ... favor vested interests and are inimical to the needs of
the poor" (Sisson, 1986: 33).
In order to determine the Bank's current level of commitment
to alleviating poverty and the extent to which the Bretton Woods
agencies' programs are "inimical to the needs of the poor, I will first
establish whether the SAP program has supported a more desirable
income distribution in Morocco. Second, I will review "orthodox"
recommendations for protecting the poor, and determine whether
concern about poverty alleviation was reflected in the design of
Morocco's Bank-supported adjustment program. In conclusion, I will
present the heterodox approach to adjustment which includes
recommendations for protecting the most vulnerable groups.
B. A More Desirable Distribution of Income?
As has been noted in the previous two chapters, it appears that
inequalities in income distribution have been reduced only slightly
over the period 1970 to 1985. By 1985, although the incidence of
absolute poverty in the population had declined, in both urban and
rural areas, the absolute number of poor had increased, and
expenditure per person was uneven, with greater inequality in the
urban areas. These findings indicate that the rapid development of
the 1970s and early 1980s, as well as the Moroccan government's
commitment to social welfare have failed to reach the poorest groups
of the SAP, short-tun indicators provide evidence that, on the whole,
they have been negative, with the largest share of the costs being
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borne by the poor who are the least able to protect themselves.
Given that the SAP was only launched in 1984 and that limited data
are available for the period after 1985, one can only speculate as to
long-run distribution of income.
Kuznets writes: "It seems plausible that in the process of
growth, the earlier periods are characterized by a balance of
counteracting forces that may widen the inequality in the size
distribution of income for a while" (1966: 67). Kuznets's "inverted-U"
hypothesis more explicitly promises greater equality in the long-run
(for Morocco as for any other country characterized by a mostly
agrarian economy which is beginning to industrialize). The
"inverted-U" represents the nature of the dependence between the
level of economic development (as measured by GNP per capita) and
the degree of economic inequality in a country (as reflected by the
Gini coefficient). Graphically, it illustrates the hypothesis that the
relative income inequality rises at the initial stages of development
then declines in the middle and later stages.
Whether Morocco's income inequality will follow this pattern,
and decline in the long-run is debatable. Much research effort has
attempted to refute the inverted-U pattern as well as the supposed
trade-off between growth and income equality (at least in the short-
run). Whereas most studies( 1 ) agree that the initial phase of
development is necessarily marked by substantial increases in the
(1) See Pawkert 1973, Chenery and Syquin 1975, Ahluwalia 1976, Lydall 1977, Fields
1980, Adelman and Robinson 1987.
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inequality of the distribution of income, there is now growing
consensus that whether inequality does or does not decrease in the
later stages of development depends on the policies which countries
follow, and on the extent to which the policies adopted narrow the
mean income gap between sectors; the extent to which they decrease
the dispersion of income with the modern sector; and the relative
speed of absorption of labor into the modern sector (Adelman and
Robinson, 1987). Furthermore, it has been found that the
determinants of income inequality and changing inequality are less
reflected by economic development (or GNP per capita) then they
are reflected by factors that accompany economic development such
as improved education, decline in the importance of agriculture,
urbanization, and reduced income inequality.
Having established that it is policy choice which will determine
whether the initial deterioration of income will persist in the later
stages of the development process, and that income distribution is
less determined by the level of development than it is by the type of
economic development pursued, the obvious question becomes: does
the structural adjustment program offer the appropriate set of
policies and "type of economic development for Morocco's economic
and social structure, or is the burden of economic adjustment for the
poor greater than that of maintaining the status quo? The orthodox
view is that "countries have little choice about whether to adjust to
the new realities of the international economy" (H&N, 1987a: iii). The
only choice is believed to be between an orderly adjustment and a
haphazard one. Based on country experience, the orthodox argument
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states that an early and orderly adjustment will produce fewer social
costs, while a disorderly or delayed adjustment is believed possible
only through rapid inflation of the continuation of unsustainable
economic imbalance suppressed through direct government controls,
which often result in black markets in goods and currencies (Heller
et al., 1988: 32). Both situations would severely hurt the poor as
these bear the inflation tax burdens associated with unsustainable
policies (whereas the better-off are able to shift their assets abroad
or to switch them to real assets). The least skilled also suffer from
unemployment (they are often the first to be laid off) which not only
translates into reduced income but may also in the longer-term
negatively affect their human capital. Poverty groups may also be
locked in the production of nontradables when unsustainable policies
provide the wrong economic signals and hence misdirect the
productive resources of the economy. Failing to "get the prices right"
may in addition hurt the poor by forcing them to pay the high prices
prevailing in the black market, as they have no access to goods at
official prices. (However, as has already been noted, devaluation
often results in large increases in officially measured prices and
raises costs through intermediate imports, therefore also adversely
affecting the poor). Finally, political interventions that become
necessary in the absence of orderly adjustment tend to divert
resources into rent-seeking activities and raise rents based on
political privilege rather than on economic performance. These
points have been raised in an IMF Occasional Paper (Heller et al.,
1988: 32). It can be argued, as structuralists do, that the proper
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comparison is not with a disorderly adjustment, but with a more
balanced adjustment process which places less emphasis on demand
management. The structuralist approach will be developed later in
the chapter.
The World Bank does not ignore the counterarguments to the
above points. It recognizes that during the process of adjustment
some social groups gain while others lose, particularly when, as in
the case of Morocco, the adjustment is aimed at a shift in sectoral
resources allocation. The concern over implementing adjustment
programs without inflicting undue hardships on the poor has
recently been the subject of much debate within the World Bank and
IMF community as well as in the structuralist school.
C Orthodox Recommendations for Protecting the Poor
In the mainstream, there have been two broad suggestions for
protecting the poor. The first is based on the belief that any attempt
to deal with poverty would undermine adjustment and that
consequently measures to help the poor are limited to short-run
compensation schemes, while longer-run implications for poverty
must be left to the trickle-down effects of growth. The second is
based on the more optimistic view that there is potential for
designing structural adjustment policies to assist in poverty
alleviation. It recommends protecting the poor during the difficult
transitional period as well as safeguarding their interest over the
long-run (Addison and Demery, 1987: 41).
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As was concluded in Chapter II, the impact of the different
adjustment policies has been largely determined by Morocco's
economic and social structure. Accordingly, the actions needed to
protect the poor during adjustment will depend on the conditions
within Morocco. However, the consensus is that "the key to achieving
adjustment that improves prospects for the poor lies in the
participation of the poor directly in the adjustment effort" (Addison
and Demery, 1987: 41). There is controversy however within the
development community as to which poor should be drawn into the
adjustment process, as evidenced at the Symposium on Poverty and
Adjustment held at the World Bank in April 1988. Three broad
poverty groups are candidates (Zuckerman, 1989: 3). First, are the
''new poor" who are the direct victims of adjustment such as civil
servants and private sector employees who were better off prior to
the austerity measures. Second are the "borderline poor" or
vulnerable, low-income groups who are affected most severely by
higher prices on consumption items, especially food, and by cutbacks
in social programs. In Morocco, the group constitutes 29.5% of the
population and includes the elderly, infants, women, and landless
and poor farmers, all of whom are the least able to protect
themselves from adjustment and recessions. Third are the extreme
or structural poor. Within this group, the urban poor tend to be more
affected by changes in the availability and prices of consumption
items than the rural poor who were already too marginalized before
the adjustment program was implemented. The extreme poor suffer
from malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, short life expectancy and high
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infant mortality rate. In Morocco they constitute 18% of the urban
population and 14% of the rural population.
Following much debate, the Symposium on Poverty and
Adjustment agreed that measures to help the poor under adjustment
should cover all the poor, not just the "new" or "borderline" poor. As
to which measures to use, several recommendations dominate the
development field. In general, recommendations center around the
design of poverty-oriented adjustment programs that maximize
primary income-generating activities for the poor, in so far as these
are economically active or are potentially productive. Primary
incomes or incomes derived from productive activities may be raised
by the adjustment process in four ways (Addison and Demery, 1987:
41). First in the spirit of "redistribution with growth", access to
productive assets, such as land irrigation and production inputs can
be improved. Second, as advocated by the neoclassical school, rates
of return on the assets of the poor can be raised by dismantling
distortions. Third, given that in most developing countries, the poor
people's chief endowment is their labor, increasing their access to
employment through improvements in the operations of the labor
market may be effective in raising their incomes. Fourth, the human
capital of the poor can be protected by ensuring their access to
health and education services through a restructuring of public
resource allocation.
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1. Improving Access to Productive Assets
Improving the access of the poor to productive assets is not
central to the adjustment program but would be consistent with its
objectives in that output and productivity can be raised in the
process. The choice of assets to distribute in Morocco includes
irrigation, fertilizers, electricity, and credit. The allocation of these
inputs has been biased in favor of the big and middle-sized farms,
while landless farmers have barely had access to them. A sustained
effort must be made to direct more investment towards depressed
areas, and to ensure a more equitable distribution of agricultural
inputs. In addition to facilitating access to agricultural inputs, the
most promising solution for the fight against the impoverishment of
the landless farmers lies in increasing their access to land ownership.
In Morocco, landlessness is a major contributor to the poverty
problem, with barely two percent of the land having been
distributed to the farmers following the independence of the
country. Land reform is therefore an indispensable means of
alleviating rural poverty; and by limiting rural exodus, can also
contribute to improving the standard of living of the urban poor.
However, such a measure presents a significant challenge to the
government who is already faced with the difficult political choices
that the structural adjustment programs entail. There has been no
attempt by the government to introduce a general land reform since
independence, although modifications of land ownership and
inheritance patterns have been made in areas subject to
development programs and irrigation schemes. Ennaji (1986: 44)
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believes that under the present socio-political trends, there is little
hope of facilitating access to land ownership to the landless. Instead,
he suggests intensified farming, greater crop variety, better markets,
higher pay for labor, and technical training according to need as
means to improve income in rural areas and hence halt the rural-
urban migration.
2. Raising the Returns on Assets
The Moroccan Bank supported adjustment program has sought
to remove distortions in product markets, raising output prices and
reducing input costs in order to promote greater efficiency in
resource allocation as well as a reduction in poverty. This
liberalization process has inevitably affected incomes and poverty
but not necessarily for the better. As has already been covered in
Chapter II price reforms have tended to increase inequalities among
the rural poor and to overburden the urban poor. "Increasing the
return on assets held by the poor therefore may require more than
improved price incentives" (Addison and Demery, 1987: 14).
Improvements in rural infrastructure and agricultural services are
necessary.
The World Bank's involvement in raising the return on assets
has been concentrated in its Agriculture Sector Loans. Bank
supported investments in the agricultural sector have so far focused
on area development, small and medium irrigation systems, and
agricultural credit. In the future, emphasis will also be placed on
natural resource management and the development of research and
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extension packages, which would benefit smaller farmers in both
rainfed and irrigated areas.
As always, the World Bank relies on stimulating growth (in this
case, in the agricultural sector), in order to improve distributional
patterns. Moreover, given that it is the small farmers who are at the
center of the Bank's strategy for the agricultural sector, it is doubtful
whether the landless poor will benefit directly.
In urban areas, measures to enhance the poor's access to
income-generating activities and some form of consumption transfer
may be required. Such measures imply a need for more resources,
including development aid, than is available to a country in crisis
such as Morocco.
3. Improving Employment Opportunities
Morocco's poor possess few productive assets other than their
labor, hence improving their access to productive employment may
be effective in raising their standard of living. Morocco however is
still at the stage of minimizing unemployment problems inherited
from past policies, as well as those caused by the adjustment
program. Morocco's unemployment rates have remained high during
adjustment because while some sectors - mainly nontradables -
contracted rapidly, others expanded at a slower pace, thereby
creating a transitional unemployment problem. The high level of
unemployment is also the result of the contraction in aggregate
demand and the reduction of the public sector.
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Given these constraints, the task for policy is "to increase the
occupational and geographical mobility of the target groups"
(Addison and Demery, 1987: 181).
In Morocco, unemployment is concentrated in the urban sector
which, in addition to increased unemployment between 1982 and
1986, has also suffered declining real wages. The above measure
ensures that the poor benefit from the expansion of employment,
particularly in the tradable sector.
The social sector strategy for Morocco suggests that more jobs
have been created during the adjustment process, but that these
have been mostly temporary jobs offering low-pay and low
productivity. Ennaji (1986: 44) adds: "the creation of non-
agricultural jobs is limited and continues to give priority to the
urban and not the rural areas." To compensate the poor more
directly, the government has created work camps. However, less
then 5% of the poorest families have benefited from this operation
(200 days of work per person a year), while the "new poor" such as
retrenched civil servants have been the major beneficiaries.
Based on the above, the policy options for the future should
include: (1) better targeted compensatory programs to protect the
poor from expected cuts in social expenditures. This should only be
a short-term measure. For a longer-term, more sustainable effort,
policy should focus on: (2) increasing productivity and low wages by
providing appropriate vocational and training programs, and
upgrading the structure of the demand for labor; (3) facilitating
informal sector activities through providing access to credit, capital
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and productive inputs for the poor through Grameen-Bank type of
institutions; and (4) legitimizing initiatives such as the "Commission
Nationale de la Promotion de l'Emploi des Jeunes" (WB, 1988:9).
To achieve the above, it is not sufficient to provide financial or
administrative measures. "The problem is to make a global change in
the economy, increase purchasing power in urban areas, and bring
about a positive change in the demand for labor (part-time work
having characterized the labor situation in Morocco in the last 15
years) (Ennaji, 1986: 45). Ennaji points out the need for
improvements in labor legislation, to be backed by a strong social
movement. In addition, he highlights the importance of serious
investment programs for the realization of the various policy
options.
4. Ensuring Access to Education and Health Services
Expenditures on human capital are essential to protect the poor
during adjustment and to help them break out of their poverty. In
Morocco, total social outlays as well as per capita income continued
to rise between 1978 and 1982, however since the implementation
of the SAP, public spending on social programs has been severely
cut, so much so that the social sector strategy (1988) suggests that
what may become imperative in the coming years is the
preservation and protection of human capital rather than its
development.
Policy options include improving demand for education and
literacy, and more direct paths to the workplace. On the supply side,
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educational poverty may be reduced by redirecting educational
resources to the poorest sectors of society (WB, 1988: 16). Currently,
the World Bank is designing an Education Sector Loan with the aim
to provide greater equity of access to educational services. The focus
is on basic education, particularly in rural areas, where measures to
increase female participation rates have received special emphasis.
For the health sector, Akin and Birdsall (1987: 41) suggest four
policies as an agenda for reform: (1) charging (mainly the relatively
wealthy) users of government health facilities; (2) introducing health
insurance programs by making them compulsory for the better-off
urban workers while subsidizing the cost of insurance premiums for
the poor; (3) encouraging provision by the nongovernment sector of
health services for which households are willing to pay - this sector
may include missionaries and other nonprofit groups, independent
physicians and pharmacists, and traditional healers and midwives;
and (4) decentralizing certain government health services to
improve organization efficiency in the provision of services. Finally,
resources for this sector must be increased.
With respect to measures taken by the Bank within the Public
Health sector, expenditure patterns are being restructured away
from the traditional urban-based, curative health care system to
emphasize preventive health care, particularly in rural areas.
Moreover, the increase in the level and efficiency of overall public
investment expenditures is a major component of the adjustment
program. To this effect, a target investment program (TIP) is being
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developed to complement private investment as well as provide for
the most urgent social needs.
Regarding public spending in general, the social sector strategy
(World Bank, 1988) finds that the current sectoral and project-based
policies are disconnected from the population distribution of the
country, suggesting a population redistribution or growth pole
development policy-framework may be more appropriate. Moreover,
the same report argues that the access to the above mentioned social
services should be maintained for the poor, even in conditions of
fiscal austerity. Suggested financing arrangements include: (1)
external borrowing, (2) transfer of funds from non-social to social
sectors, and (3) transfer of funds from other social sectors of lower
priority.
The degree of emphasis on each of the four approaches
depends on which groups constitute the poor. In Morocco, the ultra-
poor or extreme poor constitute 16% of the population. This group is
not economically active; it is not engaged in any productive activities
and hence cannot be drawn into the restructuring process. For the
ultra-poor therefore, additional measures to the ones stated above
need to be considered. These may include well designed and
targeted income and/or consumption transfers.
5. Supplementing the Resources of the Poor with Transfers
Many poor people are often locked in the production of
nontradables or are not economically active (for example women or
the elderly), they may also be locked in poverty by poor health and
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limited education. Hence their problem cannot be alleviated through
changes in primary income claims (as these are derived from
productive activities), rather income and/or consumption transfers
may be the only effective means of providing support to them
(Addison and Demery, 1987: 35). This measure is more problematic
than the above four because of the inconsistency between increasing
transfers to the poor and cutting the government's budgets. The
trade-off can be minimized by targeting such transfers to those that
need them most, while restructuring them to maximize their
benefits.
Income transfers, include employment programs which range
from direct employment to labor subsidies, to direct compensation.
Direct employment programs primarily generate employment for the
poor. However, in Morocco these "work camps" have benefitted less
the ultra-poor then they have the "new poor" such as retrenched
public employees. The government and donors also operate food-
for-work programs as another attempt to provide direct
employment. These schemes are also effective in managing
emergencies and in developing infrastructure.
The second alternative, namely labor subsidies, deserves to be
developed as it can increase the demand for labor and hence correct
the trend of increasing temporary work which has prevailed for the
last fifteen years. However, it is difficult to ensure that such
programs reach the poor.
Finally with respect to direct compensation to the unemployed,
such a scheme should be maintained even if not cost-effective in
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times of fiscal restraint. However, it should be complemented by
programs to provide credit and training to redundant public
employees as well as to rural manpower.
Another important way of protecting the welfare of the poor is
through food transfers. In Morocco, the nutritional status of the poor
has been negatively affected by devaluation, high unemployment,
falling real wages, and more directly by the cuts in food subsidies
that were introduced in 1986. These social costs, the result of
adjustment measures, establish the need for compensatory food
programs which are all the more urgent since the government plans
to entirely eliminate subsidies by 1990.
In Morocco, the rural landless and the urban poor have been
the most vulnerable to the social consequences of adjustment.
Possibilities to protect their nutritional status include the financing
by government of the difference between subsidized consumer price
for the needy and a higher market price for producers (H & N, 1987:
60). However, the fiscal burden of such dual-pricing schemes is not
in line with the fiscal restraint objectives of adjustment programs.
The World Bank's efforts to cushion the adverse consequences
of the cuts in consumption subsidies have been concentrated on
targeted compensatory programs for low-income urban and landless
rural poor. Such an effort can be improved on through the combined
use of two approaches (CEM, 1987: 21). One would use the special
agencies, which have functioned well and are precise in their
targeting to deliver nutritional assistance for specific groups such as
school children, nursing mothers, etc. The other would use "inferior
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good" varieties with lower consumer appeal that could be subsidized
at the production/processing stage and commercialized without
attracting strong demand from the not-so-poor.
In fact, socially inferior but nutritionally superior flour will be
targeted to poorer areas. This is expected to result in substantial
budgetary savings. Finally, the government and donors also operate
income transfer programs for the poor through food-for-work, school
meals, and material and infant feeding programs.
To sum up, the Bank's involvement in protecting the poor has
been concentrated in targeting food subsidies, education, and health
services. These actions by the Bank should be taken as particular
rather than typical. Moreover, not all the efforts met their stated
goal of protecting the poor and alleviating poverty. Finally, even if
the Bank has aimed at benefitting the poorest 40% of the population,
its efforts to reach the bottom 15 to 20% have been minimal.
D. The Heterodox Approach
Ideally, adjustment should induce long-term growth and an
improved standard of living for the poor. Structuralists attack
adjustment for achieving the opposite, namely stagflation and
deteriorating social conditions.
The two policies mostly criticized by the structuralist school
are those of trade liberalization and demand restraint. First,
structuralists argue that liberalization policies are not necessarily an
"engine of growth", and second that demand restraint can even be
biased against economic growth and the needs of the poor.
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With respect to liberalization policies, several empirical
studies( 2 ) have stated that trade policies and trade distortions are
not correlated with performance and countries' response to external
shocks (and these have been numerous in the past two decades). As
even Ann Kruger, a strong proponent of liberalization, writes: "while
there are numerous microeconomic changes that accompany
devaluation, liberalization, and altered (trade policy) bias, it (is) not
possible to detect significant effects of these changes on growth
performance" (1978: 277). Hence there is an agreement that policies
that stress export-led growth or that advocate "getting prices right"
can rarely be the major determinant of growth. "Internal factors are
more important in explaining the wealth of nations" (Lal, 1985a: 48).
Today, these arguments are all the more relevant in the wake
of the debt crisis (to which openness to international capital flows
contributed) and the apparent failures of many liberalization
attempts (foremost that of Mexico in the 1980s). "It is therefore
appropriate to rethink the issues" (Taylor, 1986: 1).
In his 1980 Nobel lecture, Lewis talked of "trade pessimism",
and throughout the 1980s, a wave of protectionism has gained
momentum. However, protectionist policies have proved to be
disappointing, as in some cases they intensified the foreign exchange
constraint rather than alleviated it. Nonetheless, given the current
world crisis and slow growth in the industrialized world, the foreign
(2) See McCarthy, Taylor, and Talati (1986); Balassa (1985a).
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exchange constraint on countries' development is, according to
Taylor (1986), making inward orientation and non repayment of
debt increasingly attractive options. The structure of the Moroccan
economy however is outward looking, and this orientation cannot be
easily reversed. Moreover, Maghreb markets cannot significantly
replace European ones. Taylor nevertheless maintains that: "in the
1980s, the trade liberalization strategy is intellectually moribund,
kept alive by life support from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund" (1986: 32). Morocco should therefore be cautious
that liberalization and debt-repayment do not undermine its
regional development. The government should concentrate on
furthering economic unity and cooperation among North African
countries, rather than pursuing increasing openness, especially in the
face of rising world protectionism.
In addition to arguing that the impact of liberalization on
growth is uncertain and even detrimental to the regional
development of LDCs, the structuralist school criticizes adjustment
programs for seeking excessive reduction in aggregate demand,
which results in an unnecessary contraction of output, employment
and standards of living of poverty groups.
Having stated these points, progressive economists'
recommendations are several. Although he describes the policies
included in orthodox packages as "ploys", Taylor by his own
admission writes: "a structuralist package would no doubt include
many of the (orthodox) policies. Not many others are known" (1983:
202). However, improvements on the package are suggested. First,
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given that the various policies have been shown to cause output loss
or trigger inflation, it is recommended that they not be imposed
simultaneously. The case for gradualism is even stronger given that
in Morocco, as in most countries, those negatively affected are the
poor. In addition, political considerations tend to dominate the
arguments in favor of gradualism.
Second, a more balanced adjustment process which places less
emphasis on demand restraint is believed to be more desirable,
entailing less social and economic costs that usually threaten the
financial and political systems.
Third, the distributional and employment implications of the
program should be incorporated. Based on social accounting matrices,
the relevant economic groups can be identified, as well as their role
in the macro system, and their political and economic
interconnections.
Fourth, it is recommended that the program be redesigned to
reflect more adequately institutional settings and the circumstances
of the country in question. Attention needs to be paid to institutions,
grass roots organization and culture. "The relatively high rate of
failure for projects in Africa has stemmed from mistaken
assumptions about the likely behavior of the people involved"
(Beckman, 1986: 29). Hence, "listening to the people" is strongly
advocated as a means of ensuring the viability of the program and
the welfare of the poor.
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These recommendations all require substantial resources, more
than is available to an economy in crisis; hence additional external
financing is essential.
Other suggestions within the development community have
been advanced. They mainly underscore the need to protect the poor
during the initial period of adjustment, as well as in the longer-run.
In particular, arguing that reviving growth (and thereby increasing
the absolute income of the poor) is not a sufficient measure to
protect the poor, Adelman (Adelman and Robinson, 1987) advocates
a policy of "redistribution before growth," which in the context of
Morocco would encourage tenurial reform in agriculture before the
implementation of policies designed to improve the productivity of
agriculture; and massive investments in education before rapid
industrialization.
Finally, the UNICEF study( 3) presents a strong argument for
the adjustment program to assume an activist role. It stresses that
adjustment policies should be used as an instrument for mitigating
the adverse distributional implications of external shocks and even
for improving the welfare of poverty groups. This hence advocates
for adjustment to be seen in the broader context of strategies for
poverty alleviation. However, it must be noted that even the
strategies designed specifically for poverty alleviation (whether by
governments, the World Bank or other agencies) have rarely
attempted to reach the bottom 15 to 20% of the population. Yet these
(3) See Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart (1987)
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are precisely the people who need support. In Morocco, they
constitute 18% of the population.
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Chapter IV.
Recently, there has been controversy surrounding the social
costs of stabilization and adjustment in developing countries. One
side claims that the programs have substantially deteriorated the
standard of living of the poor, while the other argues that the costs
borne by the poor are only transitional and that the failure to adjust
would worsen social conditions further.
This study has shown that the Moroccan Bank-supported
adjustment program has so far had severe implications for income
distribution. The changes in income distribution are not considered
the undesirable side-effects of the program by its designers, rather
they are its intended outcome. These changes are the principal
incentives for resource reallocation; they facilitate the "expenditure
switching" process and are therefore believed essential for the
realization of the objectives of adjustment.
This is not to argue that adjustment is unnecessary, or that its
economic and social costs are greater than those of maintaining the
status quo. On the contrary, adjustment is increasingly recognized as
being necessary for correcting the severe economic imbalances that
characterize developing countries today. However, this does not
imply that all adjustment policies are equally adequate for ensuring
an adjustment program that is compatible with growth.
Adjustment which promotes increases in exports, savings, and
investment is more supportive of growth and improved living
standards for the poor than a program which relies on cuts in
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Conclusions
investment and public spending. However, when the latter
contractionary policies are necessary to deal with the substantial
balance of payments and budget deficits, economic efficiency and
public awareness must be increased to better target scarce resources
towards the needy. Moreover, austerity measures need to be
accompanied by compensatory programs to protect the most
vulnerable groups.
The concern is therefore with how to integrate human
considerations into the process of economic policymaking. This
concern is best captured by the "adjustment with a human face"
approach (Cornia et. al., 1987) which advocates for a poverty
alleviation dimension to be added to adjustment, in the same way as
"redistribution with growth" and "basic needs" added such a
dimension to growth. The need to protect the poor is even greater
given that the international economic environment is such that
growth may not be assumed. Indeed, in many developing countries,
output per capita is declining, hence entailing falling incomes for the
poor, even with constant income distribution; and as has been
demonstrated, the burden of adjustment policies often fall
disproportionately on the poor.
This thesis has shown that there is much potential for
improving program design and implementation towards the addition
of a poverty dimension to adjustment; and that this can be achieved
without undermining the objectives of adjustment.
The success of the Moroccan program will therefore depend on
fresh approaches to reducing poverty, which are consistent with
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adjustment and improve on past efforts. Poverty alleviation must
become an explicit objective before policies to restore economic
stability and revive growth can benefit the poor.
The main conclusion is that social development can and should
be promoted simultaneously with economic adjustment. Apart from
its social justification, achieving tangible progress in raising living
standards and providing employment opportunities in what still is a
very poor country is also important for the stability of the political
system. If the economy remains in crisis, or the adjustment
measures continue to be perceived as detrimental to the poor, either
the army or Islamic Fundamentalists (though neither currently poses
a threat) could become the outlet of unsatisfied demand for social
justice.
Hence, the economic challenge facing the government is to
ensure that, by the early 1990s, the espousal of the neoclassical
economics embodied by the IMF's and the World Bank's adjustment
program will be perceived as the appropriate orientation for the
economy.
Finally, regardless of how successful a strategy is, it is less
likely to generate unrest if the population believes that the burden
is being distributed fairly and that it can influence the political
process. In order to mobilize public support for reform, the king
must pursue a policy of decentralization of power, an initiative he
introduced in 1975 only to abandon in the late 1970s. He must
permit not only a major restructuring of his economy, but also that
of the nation's patrimonial political system.
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